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A quick glance through the Supreme Court’s Indian law jurisprudence reveals that the 
Court’s doctrine is all but disconnected from the Constitution’s text. The Supreme Court routinely 
upholds federal plenary power over Indian affairs,1 and the Court has said that this power originates 
from the Indian Commerce Clause.2 But that rationale is inconsistent with the Court’s Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence—the Court has said that “commerce” means trade, or, more broadly, 
economic activity,3 and economic activity is far narrower than plenary power.  
Recently, Justice Thomas observed this disconnect and argued that the Court should scale 
back its Indian law jurisprudence. Although the Articles of Confederation expressly granted 
Congress the power to regulate “Indian affairs,” he argues, the Constitution only expressly grants 
Congress the power to regulate “Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes.”4 The power to regulate 
“affairs” is broader than the power to regulate “Commerce”—that is, trade or economic activity—
so Justice Thomas concludes that “[b]y limiting Congress’ power to [Commerce], the Framers 
declined to grant Congress the same broad powers over Indian affairs conferred by the Articles of 
Confederation.”5 Justice Thomas is not alone in this opinion. Other originalists, such as Professor 
Saikrishna Prakash6 and Robert Natelson7, reach the same conclusion. 
While Justice Thomas would bring Indian law into accord with modern Commerce Clause 
doctrine, his view is only the first of three general ideological camps. The second camp is the 
liberal originalists consisting of Professors Akhil Amar and Jack Balkin.8 Although primarily 
writing in the Interstate Commerce Clause arena, Amar and Balkin, have argued that, at the 
founding, the word “commerce,” had two definitions. 9 The first meant “trade.” The second 
definition was broader, meaning “intercourse,” whether or not strictly economic. Since 
“intercourse” is roughly equivalent to “affairs,” the text of the Commerce Clause confers on 
Congress roughly the same power over Indians that Congress possessed in the Articles of 
Confederation.  
The final group consists of Professor Gregory Ablavsky and Lorrainne Toler, who argue 
that the combination of the War, Treaty, Commerce, and Supremacy Clauses act as a sort of 
constitutional field-preemption, reserving the realm of Indian affairs solely to the federal 
government.10  
 
1 See, e.g., U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). 
2 Id. 
3 See, e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, para. 3. 
5 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 664 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
6 Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1089-90 (2004) (“Therefore, the fact 
that the Constitution never grants Congress the power to manage Indian affairs indicates that the Constitution does 
not mean for Congress to have such a power.”). 
7 Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201, 229 
(2007). 
8 Akhil Reed Amar, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107-108 n. (2005); Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
9 See Amar, supra note 8; Balkin, supra note 8. 
10 Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 Yale L. J. 1012 (2015); Lorrainne Toler, The 
Missing Indian Affairs Clause, 88 UNIV. OF CHI. L. R.  413 (March 2021). 
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The outcome of this debate has broad implications in both Indian law and Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. If adopted, Justice Thomas’s view would overturn over a century of Indian 
law precedent and an entire Title of the United States Code related to Indian law (25 U.S.C.) 
would be rendered unconstitutional. Given that the Court’s current Interstate Commerce Clause 
doctrine holds that “Commerce” refers to economic activity,11 Justice Thomas’s critique carries 
force, and, as other scholars have noted, Justice Thomas’s willingness to question precedent may 
pressure the Court to change its doctrine.12  
And the Amar/Balkin approach has profound implications for Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.  To see why, consider what Professor Prakash has called the “presumption of 
intrasentence uniformity.”13 This presumption holds that one word means the same thing 
throughout an entire sentence.  So, if “commerce” means “intercourse,” in the Indian Commerce 
Clause context, then “commerce” arguably means “intercourse” in the Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Clauses too. If so, current immigration and foreign affairs doctrine would rest on 
firmer textual ground,14 and Congress would have the power to regulate in the case of a global 
pandemic, such as the Coronavirus.15 
This article is the final word in this debate. This article establishes that the founding 
generation understood the word “commerce” in the Indian Commerce Clause to mean 
“intercourse,” rather than strictly trade or economic activity. This interpretation accords with the 
early history of the republic, and it was explicitly adopted in America’s earliest statutes, 
congressional traditions, and in two of Justice John Marshall’s foundational Indian law cases.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores how structural deficiencies in the 
Articles of Confederation nearly led to an unwinnable war against the Indians. Under the Articles 
of Confederation, the national government and certain state governments clashed over the 
jurisdiction of Indian affairs. While the Articles gave Congress “sole and exclusive” power to 
“regulate . . . Indian affairs,” that power was subject to two exceptions, which allowed the states 
to retain a degree of power.16 Some states interpreted the Indian Affairs Clause’s two exceptions 
to mean both that states could independently treat and war with Indian tribes and that Congress 
could not agree to any treaty which affected state sovereignty. By the time of the Constitutional 
Convention, these states’ actions had led the Secretary of War, Henry Knox, to warn Congress of 
the impending likelihood of an unwinnable war against a general Indian confederacy.17 
 The specter of this war loomed as the convention delegates met to draft the Constitution. 
Part II examines the Constitution’s drafting and ratification history. In the days leading up to the 
 
11 See, e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
12  Ralph A. Rossum, UNDERSTANDING CLARENCE THOMAS: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
RESTORATION 214-21 (2014); Jeffrey Toobin, Partners, 87 NEW YORKER 40-51 (2011). See also, Ablavsky, supra 
note 10 at 1016.  
13 Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. 
REV. 1149 (2003) [hereinafter “Our Three Commerce Clauses”]. 
14 Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
15 Akhil Amar, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY: TIMELESS LESSONS FOR THE ISSUES OF OUR ERA 1, 395 (2016) 
[hereinafter “The Constitution Today”]. 
16 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4. 
17 See infra Part I. 
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Constitutional Convention, Madison lamented that the weak Articles had proved unable to halt 
“[e]ncroachments by the States on the federal authority,” such as “the Wars and Treaties of Georgia 
with the Indians.”18 Both Madison’s Virginia Plan and the Committee of Detail’s first draft of the 
Constitution shored up the federal government’s War and Treaty powers and thus remedied those 
pieces of the Articles that had nearly led the nation to war.19 Significantly, these pieces of the 
Committee’s draft remained virtually unchanged in the final Constitution.20 
The final draft of the Constitution, however, never explicitly conferred on Congress an 
Indian affairs power, instead only conferring the power to regulate Commerce with the Indian 
tribes. Recent scholarship by Lorrainne Toler has established that the drafters of the Constitution 
actually intended to include an Indian affairs power in the Constitution.21 But, due to a simple 
mistake, they instead merely added Indians to the pre-existing Interstate Commerce Clause.22  
Whatever the Founder’s intentions, as Steven Calabrasi has argued in the Fourteenth 
Amendment context, the final text of the Constitution trumps any intended application.23 Thus, 
even as the Constitution shored up the structural inadequacies of the Articles, it created a potential 
gap in federal power over Indian affairs. 
 Despite this potential gap, in the ratification debates, both federalist and anti-federalist 
understood that the Constitution conferred a general Indian affairs power on the federal 
government.  
Part III examines the post-ratification history of the Constitution. Even before the 
Constitution was adopted by all thirteen States, Washington and the First Congress moved to 
assuage Indian hostilities in the South. The Washington Administration explicitly claimed that the 
Constitution’s War, Treaty, Commerce, and Supremacy Clauses gave the federal government 
absolute national power over treaty negotiations with the Indians.24 In light of this post-ratification 
history, it is clear that the Constitution was intended to—and in fact did—increase the federal 
government’s power over the Indians. 
However, it was not until a few years after ratification that the United States had to grapple 
with the apparent gap between “affairs” and “commerce” in the Constitution.  Part IV examines 
how the founding generation handled this gap. The issue crystalized in front of the First Congress, 
who passed a statute—the Trade and Intercourse Act—establishing trade regulations with Indians, 
and, importantly, prohibiting Americans from committing non-economic crimes against Indians 
on Indian territory—even when no treaty existed between the United States and the tribe at issue. 
And George Washington—who had previously spoken of America’s power “to regulate 
 
18 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, VOL. 9, 9 APRIL 1786 – 24 MAY 1787 AND SUPPLEMENT 1781–1784, 345-358 
(Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1975). 
19 See infra Part II. 
20  Id. 
21 Toler, supra note 10. 
22 Id. 
23 Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 3 (2011). 
24 See infra Part III. 
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intercourse with the Indians”25—signed this Act into law. Under the Originalists’ economic 
definition of “commerce,” no constitutional clause obviously justifies the Trade and Intercourse 
Act, and efforts to justify these statutes by Originalist scholars such as Natelson are unpersuasive. 
The Trade and Intercourse Act became one of the bedrocks of American Indian policy. 
Subsequent Congresses passed new Trade and Intercourse Acts, forming a tradition that eventually 
led Justice John Marshall to contend in two of the three foundational Indian law cases—Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia26 and Worcester v. Georgia27—that the Commerce Clause conferred on 
Congress the power “to regulate intercourse.”28 
This Article concludes by describing implications of this broad definition of Commerce 
and areas of future research. Current doctrine holds that the federal government possesses plenary 
power over the Indian tribes, including their internal affairs. Even if the Commerce Clause confers 
an Indian affairs power on Congress, at first glance, it is not clear that this power can justify the 
regulation of the purely internal affairs of the Indians. Future research should seek to map this 
broad definition of Commerce onto Indian doctrine.  More importantly, given what Prakash has 
called the “presumption of intrasentence uniformity,”29 “commerce” should have the same 
meaning in all three of the Commerce Clauses. Besides providing a firmer textual basis for the 
Court’s Foreign Affairs and Immigration doctrines,30 a broad definition of Commerce in the 
Interstate Commerce Clause provides an analytically satisfying explanation of modern Commerce 
Clause doctrine and provides Congress with the power to regulate in the case of a global pandemic, 
such as the Coronavirus.31 Nevertheless, the historical and structural elements that argue in favor 
of a broad definition of the Indian Commerce Clause appear absent in the Interstate context, and 
future research is needed to explore the appropriateness of a broad definition of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause. 
 
I. CONFEDERATION AMERICA 
 
To understand life under the Articles of Confederation, it is first necessary to understand 
how the Articles’ provisions divided—or failed to divide—authority between the state and national 
governments. In combination, the Articles of Confederation’s Indian Affairs Clause and two 
Treaty Clauses failed to clearly delineate the line between State and National authority in the realm 
of Indian Affairs. Because the Articles of Confederation provided for neither judicial resolution 
nor congressional enforcement, these structural flaws caused conflict that could not be resolved.  
Left to fester, this conflict nearly led confederate-era America to the brink of a catastrophic Indian 
war.  
 
25 Letter from George Washington to Thomas Mifflin (Sept. 4, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 
396. 
26 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
27 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (Marshal, J.). 
28 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 14. 
29 Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses, supra note 13. 
30 Balkin, supra note 8. 




A. The Articles of Confederation’s Application to Indian Affairs 
 
The Articles of Confederation contained several provisions relevant to Indian affairs: The 
Indian Affairs Clause, the Treaty Clauses, the War Clause, and the Nine-State Clause. Equally 
important, however, were the provisions which the Articles lacked. The Articles did not allow 
Congress to impose duties and taxes. Nor did they provide that Congress’ laws and treaties would 
be supreme over State law. Finally, the Articles did not provide for a judiciary to resolve disputes.  
 
1. Indian Affairs Clause 
 
First, the Articles gave Congress “the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating 
the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states; provided that 
the legislative right of any state, within its own limits, be not infringed or violated.”32 Although 
the power to regulate “affairs” was theoretically quite broad, practically, it included the power to 
conduct diplomacy, negotiate treaties, regulate commerce, and manage war and peace.  
The power’s theoretic breadth flows from the wide definition of the word “affair.” Samuel 
Johnson’s dictionary defined “affair” as “Business; something to be managed or transacted.”33 
Similarly, Francis Allen’s defined it as “[s]omething done or to be done.”34 And Nathan Baily’s 
defined it as “business, concern, matter, or thing.”35 Several scholars have thus noted that 
Congress’ power to regulate Indian affairs seems quite broad.36 By the plain text of the word 
“affairs”, if  something concerned the Indians, then Congress had the power to regulate. 
As a matter of practice, however, this power was used to achieve specific ends: conducting 
diplomacy, negotiating treaties, regulating commerce, and making war and peace. This practice 
extended back to the earliest days of this country. Less than three months after Lexington and 
Concord, the Continental Congress’ Committee of Indian Affairs created three Departments of 
Indian Affairs, which were to “treat” and establish commercial relations with the Indians “in order 
to preserve peace,”37 and this practice continued during the Confederation. For example, a 
congressional committee composed of Charles Pinckney, James Monroe, and Rufus King reported 
that each Department’s superintendent’s responsibilities included diplomacy,38 war,39 and the 
 
32 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4. 
33 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London 1755). 
34 FRANCIS ALLEN, A COMPLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (London 1765). 
35 NATHAN BAILEY, A UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Edinburgh 25th ed. 1783). 
36 See Natelson, supra note 7 at 284; Prakash, supra note 6 at 1084. 
37 2 J. CONT’L. CONG. 175-76 (July 12, 1775).  
38 See, e.g., 30 J. CONT’L CONG. 367, 369 (Jun. 28, 1786) (“[I]t be the [Superintendent’s] duty . . . to discourage all 
combinations of Indians, and persuade the several tribes to keep and act as much independent of each other as 
possible.”). 
39 See, e.g., id. (“[I]t be the [Superintendent’s] duty . . . [that] if war should be Necessary at any time or unavoidable 
to give it such direction as to keep it at a distance from the Citizens of the United States.”). 
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regulation of commerce.40 Along with the power to wage war, according to this congressional 
committee, the Department of Indian Affairs possessed the power to negotiate treaties.41 These 
duties and powers were reaffirmed in a late-Confederation report from the Southern District of 
Indian Affairs, which declared, “in managing affairs with [the Indians], the principal objects have 
been those of making war and peace, purchasing certain tracts of their land, fixing the boundaries 
between them and our people, and preventing the latter settling on lands left in possession [by 
treaty] of the former.”42 These records show that, whatever the theoretic limits of Congress’ Indian 
affairs power, that power was practically used to engage in precisely the type of affairs one would 
expect: diplomacy, treaty-making, commerce, and war. 
The Indian Affairs Clause also had two exceptions. The first was the “Not-Members” 
exception, which excluded Indians who were “members of any of the states.”43 And the second 
was the “Legislative-Rights” exception, which prohibited Congress from “infring[ing] or 
violat[ing]” “the legislative right of any state, within its own limits.”44  
To understand these exceptions, it is helpful to look at the Articles’ drafting history. The 
first draft of the Articles gave Congress the power, without exception, to “regulat[e] the Indian 
trade and manag[e] all Affairs with the Indians.”45 Some states were dissatisfied with this exclusive 
grant of power.46 So, after debate, the Committee of the Whole presented Congress with a revised 
draft, which added the Not-Members Exception.47 As Natelson points out, “contemporaneous 
dictionaries make clear, the requirement that an Indian be a ‘member’ of a state meant that he had 
to be integrated into the body-politic as a citizen—or at least a taxpayer—of the state.”48 While 
many Indian tribes resided outside the country’s borders in early America, some sovereign Indian 
tribes resided within states’ borders. The Not-Members Exception excluded these intra-state tribes 
from congressional power and reserved that power for the states. As Madison explained, “By 
Indian[s] not members of a State, must be meant those, I conceive who do not live within the body 
of the Society, or whose Persons or property form no objects of its laws.”49  
States’ rights advocates wanted more. One proposed adding the modifier “not residing 
within the limits of any of the United States.”50 Another proposed limiting Congress’ trade power 
to only “with such nations and tribes as are not resident within such limits wherein a particular 
 
40 By far the largest portion of the Committee’s report is dedicated to commerce with the Indians. See, e.g., Id. 
(“They shall superintend such regulations as Congress shall from time to time establish respecting the Indian 
trade.”); see also Natelson, supra note 7 at 217. 
41 33 J. Cont’l. Cong. 66, 67 (Feb. 20, 1787) (“[I]t [is] necessary that the United States should be at peace with the 
Indians . . . . In this business it will be necessary not only to mark precisely the grounds of the present evils, but to 
ascertain the remedies, if any, which are within the power of the union . . . .”). 
42 33 J. CONT’L. CONG. 458 (Aug. 3, 1787). 
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4 
44 Id. 
45 3 J. CONT’L. CONG. 550 (July 12, 1776). 
46 For a brief discussion on some of the State’s complaints, see Natelson, supra note 7, at 228. 
47 5 J. CONT’L. CONG. 681-82 (Aug. 20, 1776). 
48 Natelson, supra note 7, at 229.  
49 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, VOL. 8, 10 MARCH 1784 – 28 MARCH 1786, 156-159 (Robert A. Rutland & 
William M. E. Rachal eds., 1973); see also Natelson, supra note 7, at 234.  
50 9 J. CONT’L. CONG. 841, 844 (Oct. 27, 1777). 
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State claims, and actually exercises jurisdiction.”51 Both proposals were rejected, however, and 
the final draft added only the Legislative-Rights Exception.  
Clearly, the Legislative-Rights Exception broadened states’ authority beyond merely 
citizen-Indians, though the precise limits of this authority remain hazy. Some states would later 
assert that their legislative right was violated any time Congress’ action affected a state’s 
legislative authority. According to these states, Congress would violate a state’s authority if it 
negotiated part of a state’s land away in a treaty.  On the other side, nationalists, such as Madison, 
thought this addition meant only that states had a preemptive right to land within their state.52 
According to Madison, a broad interpretation of “legislative rights,” such as some states advanced, 
would “destroy the authority of Congress” because “no act of Congress within the limits of a State 
can be conceived which will not in some way or another encroach upon the authority [of the] 
States.”53 While most scholars agree with Madison,54 Natelson is sympathetic to the states.55 
Whichever side was ultimately correct, these conflicting interpretations were a recurrent issue in 
the early Republic.  
 
2. Treaty Clauses 
 
The Articles also gave Congress the “sole and exclusive” power of entering into treaties, 
with one exception.56 Congress could not enter a treaty of commerce if “the legislative powers of 
the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as 
their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species 
of goods or commodities whatsoever.”57  In other words, Congress could make commerce treaties, 
but they couldn’t make commerce treaties that limited states’ ability to tax or restrict trade. 
Another part of the Articles prohibited any State from entering into any treaty “with any 
King, Prince, or State.”58 Although the Mohedian Indian cases had established Indian tribes as 
sovereigns,59 Legally, Indians were viewed as lesser sovereigns than a “King, Prince, or State.” 
For example, unlike foreign States, when Congress treated with the Indians, a section of the treaty 
normally declared the Indians to be under the protection of the United States.60 And the treaties 
also prohibited the Indian tribes from engaging in trade with other powers.61 Indeed, a generation 
after the founding, Justice Marshall cited these treaty provisions for the principle that Indian tribes 
 
51 9 J. CONT’L. CONG. 841, 844 (Oct. 27, 1777).  
52 See Letter from James Madison, infra note 183. 
53 Id.  
54 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 38, 49 (1984) (citing Madison and characterizing the proviso 
as “cast[ing] a heavy blur over the article” and “hazy”). 
55 Natelson, supra note 7 at 234. 
56 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. art. VI., para. 2.  
59  Robert N. Clinton, "The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over 
the Management of Indian Affairs," 69 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (BULR), 329 (1989). 




were not foreign states but rather “domestic dependent nations.”62 Thus, this qualifying language 
provided States with at least pretextual legal grounds to treat independently with Indian tribes, 
especially those residing within their boundaries.  
A further complication arises from the interaction of the Treaty Clauses with the Indian 
Affairs Clause. As discussed, the Indian Affairs Clause included the power to negotiate treaties. 
At the same time, the Indian Affairs Clause was subject to the Not-Members and Legislative-Right 
Exceptions. The overlap between the Treaty Clauses and the Indian Affairs Clause thus posed 
potential problems: What if a state negotiated a treaty with some members of Tribe X, and 
Congress negotiated a treaty with other members of Tribe X, and the terms of those two treaties 
conflicted? Would the congressional treaty take precedence because of Congress’ “sole and 
exclusive” treaty power? Or would the state treaty take precedence because Congress was 
prohibited from regulating Indian affairs when it infringed the legislative rights of the state? The 
Articles answered none of these questions. 
 
3. Absent Provisions: War, Taxing, Voting Provisions, and No Judiciary 
 
Whatever powers Congress did in fact possess, as Professor Amar notes, “Congress had no 
effective means of carrying out” these powers.63 Although the Articles provided that Congress 
would have “sole and exclusive” power to determine peace and war, including a war with the 
Indians,64 it did not grant Congress the power to levy taxes to fund war should it declare one, 
instead providing that expenses would be “supplied by the several States” who would themselves 
levy taxes on their citizens.65 As Professor Amar says, even though, “[o]n paper, such requisitions 
were ‘binding,’” in practice, “they were mere requests.”66 This inability to raise funds posed 
problems for the national government, because, as Thucydides once remarked, “War is a matter 
not so much of arms as of money.”67  
 
4. The Nine-State Clause 
 
The Articles’ state-centric voting procedure also limited Congress’s effective power. To 
enter treaties or wars, at least nine States had to agree.68 The Articles thus opted for a state-centric 
voting model; unlike the Constitution, votes were not counted by the number of delegates, but by 
the number of states. However, as Pinckney would later explain, “[I]t was frequently difficult to 
obtain a representation from nine states; and if only nine States were present, they must all concur 
 
62 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 20 U.S. 1, 5-15 (1831). 
63 Amar, supra note 8, at 28. 
64 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1. 
65 Id. at art. VIII, para. 1-2. 
66 Amar, supra note 8, at 28. 
67 THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Rex Warner trans., 1972). 
68 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 6. 
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in making a treaty. A single member would frequently prevent the business from being concluded; 
and if he absented himself, Congress had no power to compel his attendance.”69 
Finally, the Articles provided no judicial enforcement mechanism. The Articles did not 
provide for a judiciary. Instead, they created a labyrinthine procedure to resolve disputes that does 
not appear to have been frequently used.70 And, as Professor Amar points out, under the Articles, 
Congress “had no explicit ‘legislative’ or ‘governmental’ power to making binding ‘law’ 
enforceable in state courts.”71  
 
B. Life Under the Articles: States Interference with National Treaty Efforts 
 
These provisions of the Articles almost immediately caused conflict between the states and 
Congress. Georgia and North Carolina interpreted the Legislative-Rights Exception of the Indian 
Affairs Clause to undermine Congress’ authority to negotiate and enforce treaties with the Indians 
and to give States the power to treat independently with the Indian tribes. This interpretation, 
combined with other structural flaws in the Articles, caused unresolvable conflict that nearly led 
the United States to a ruinous Indian war.  
Under the Treaty of Paris of 1783, Great Britain ceded all claims to territory east of the 
Mississippi to the United States. But because the Treaty of Paris said nothing about the Indians, 
the United States technically remained at war with them.72 At the same time, westward expansion 
was an important goal for Congress, the individual states, and citizens themselves.73 George 
Washington, however, recognized that “[the Indians] would not suffer their Country . . . to be 
wrestled from them without another struggle.”74 To secure Indian land, Washington suggested that 
Congress should “purchas[e] their Lands in preference to attempting to drive them by force of 
arms out of their Country.”75 Congress appears to have heeded Washington’s advice. On October 
15, 1783, Congress passed an Ordinance that called for treaty conventions with various Indians 
tribes to establish boundaries and regulate Indian trade.76  
But states frequently interfered with national efforts to negotiate treaties. Georgia was one 
of the worst offenders. On March 15, 1785, Congress resolved to appoint commissioners to treat 
with “the Cherokee and all other Indians southward of them.”77 The Creek was one such tribe, 
located near Georgia. But Georgia was determined to negotiate a treaty with the Creek for Creek 
 
69 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 280 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. 
70 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 2. 
71 Amar, supra note 8, at 28. 
72 See Prucha, supra note 54, at 74. 
73 Id. 
74 Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), in Founders Online, National Archives, accessed 
Sept. 29, 2019. 
75 Id.  
76 25 J. CONT’L. CONG. 680-94 (Oct. 15, 1783). For an extended discussion on early treaty negotiations, see Robert 
N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055 (1995). 
77 33 J. CONT’L. CONG. 680-94 (Mar. 15, 1785). 
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land before the Commissioners could arrive.78 On June 9, Georgia’s Governor wrote Colonel 
Elijah Clarke, a state agent assigned to treat on behalf of Georgia, urging haste, for “it is a business 
of the first consequence to the state and should not be delayed, especially as the commissioners 
from Congress will shortly be on the same errand.”79 The Creek, however, would not meet with 
Georgia until the congressional Commissioners arrived.80 
By the time the Commissioners arrived, unfortunately, only two out of the 100 Creek towns 
were present at the negotiation.81 The Commissioners informed the Creek that they could not 
negotiate with such a small minority and left.82 Agents from Georgia, however, stayed behind and 
negotiated a treaty whereby the “Creeks,” who were, the treaty proclaimed, “Members of 
Georgia,” relinquished the entirety of Creek territory into “the limits of the State of Georgia.”83 
Unsurprisingly, the rest of the Creek refused to accept this treaty, and when white settlers began 
to flood in, the Creek sent warriors to drive them out.84 The Georgians responded by tricking the 
Creek. They guaranteed the Creek’s safety if the Creek’s Chiefs would parlay with them.85 But 
when the Creek Chiefs arrived, they were apprehended, threatened, and coerced into another 
treaty.86  
Following these events, relations between Georgia and the Creek continued to devolve. 
The commissioners would come to suspect that so few Creek tribes had arrived for treaty 
negotiations because their leader, Alexander McGillivay, had commanded them to hold back. They 
suspected further that McGillivay was in the pay of the Spanish, and they later learned that the 
Creek had entered a treaty with Spain whereby the Creek agreed to trade exclusively with the 
Spanish.87  
This trade agreement was concerning because the European powers used commerce to 
manage political relations with the Indians. In one of his first addresses to Congress, Washington 
noted that “the trade of the Indians is a main mean of their political management.”88 Many 
Europeans and Founding-era Americans were proponents of Montesquieu’s doux commerce 
theory, which held that countries who trade with one another remain at peace. By establishing 
exclusive commercial relations with the Creek, the Spanish improved their relationship, while 
straining America’s relationship, with the Creek. While this effect aided the Spanish—by creating 
a barrier between the United States—it hurt the United States, because it made war with the Creek 
more likely.  
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Indeed, over the ensuing years, Georgia’s relations with the Creek continued to 
disintegrate. Ultimately, Secretary of War Henry Knox reported to Congress in July of 1787 that 
the Creek “have commenced, or soon will commence hostilities” against Georgia.89 Knox worried 
that “there is the greatest reason that a general hostile confederacy of the Southern Indians will be 
speedily formed.”90  
The Cherokee would likely have been a member of such a confederacy. In late November 
of 1785, a congressional commission and the Cherokee signed the Treaty of Hopewell, which 
established clear boundary lines and guaranteed the Cherokee the right to certain lands.91 North 
Carolina and Georgia rejected this treaty from the outset. As treaty negotiations were beginning, 
William Blount, an agent of North Carolina, sent the Commissioners in charge of treaty 
negotiations two letters. The first informed the Commissioners of boundary lines that had existed 
in North Carolina’s constitution since 1776.92 The second detailed a statute on North Carolina’s 
books that contained the Cherokee to certain lands.93 Perhaps unsurprisingly, North Carolinian 
speculators had been committing atrocities against the Cherokee and Chickasaws and claiming 
their land since the closing days of the revolution.94 North Carolinia’s claim to this land was, 
therefore, quite questionable. Indeed, much of the land that North Carolina claimed title to would 
not pass into the hands of the United States for another generation.95 Nevertheless, if the 
Commissioners gave any land to the Cherokee in violation of these documents, Blount wrote, 
North Carolina would “consider such a treaty a violation and infringement upon her legislative 
rights.”96 Georgia had employed similarly nefarious measures to claim part of the Cherokee’s 
land,97 and Georgia was unwilling to relinquish it: Georgia’s General Assembly called Congress’ 
“pretended treaty” at Hopewell “a manifest and direct attempt to violate the retained sovereignty 
and legislative right of this State.”98 Writing to Congress, the Commissioners noted that, without 
North Carolina and Georgia’s support, “difficulties [would] frequently arise” that would make the 
treaty “ineffectual.”99 Nevertheless, Congress accepted the treaty.100 
The Commissioners’ warning proved prophetic. In July of 1787, Knox informed Congress 
that “the treaty made by the Commissioners . . . at Hopewell . . . has been flagrantly violated by 
the usurpation of the lands signed by the said treaty as the hunting grounds of the Cherokee.”101 
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The parties’ disagreement turned on the extent of the Articles’ Legislative-Right 
Exception. In Georgia and North Carolina’s view, Congress had violated their legislative right by 
negotiating away land that those States claimed. Nationalists thought that, while States could 
negotiate with tribes within their boundaries, these negotiations were invalid to the extent they 
conflicted with a national treaty or a national effort to negotiate a treaty.102 
This interpretive debate provides the necessary background to understand Knox’s report to 
Congress. As discussed in July of 1787, Knox advised Congress that Georgia and North Carolina’s 
land grabs had led to imminent hostilities with the Creek, and, likely, “a general confederacy of 
the Southern Indians.”103 To avoid such a “ruinous” event as the creation of a hostile Southern 
Indian confederacy, Knox made three suggestions:104  
• First, Congress could adopt an interpretation of the Articles allowing Congress “to 
regulate the necessary boundaries for the independent tribes of Indians, 
notwithstanding they might be comprehended within the limits of any State.”105  
• Second, Georgia and North Carolina could request that the United States act as 
judge in the border dispute.106  
• Third, Georgia and North Carolina could cede the disputed territory to the United 
States.107  
If none of these actions were taken, Knox worried that the United States would find itself 
engaged in a “general Indian war,”108 for which “the finances of the United States are such at 
present as to render them utterly unable to maintain an Indian war with any dignity or prospect of 
success.”109 
Less than a month later, Congress took up the issue. Congressmen Few and Blount moved 
to direct the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern Department to invite the Creek to a 
treaty negotiation.110 Before this resolution could be considered, Congressman Nathan Dane of 
Massachusetts moved to table that motion to consider a report from the Southern Department of 
Indian Affairs.111 The report noted: 
 
There can be no doubt that settlements are made by our people on the lands secured 
to the Cherokees, by the late treaty between them and the United States; and also 
on lands near the Oconee claimed by the Creek, various pretences seem to be set 
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unconfidentially [sic] with the Comisrs. of Congs. she has violated both duty & decorum”). 
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up by the white people for making these settlements, which the Indians tenacious 
of their rights, appear to be determined to oppose.112 
 
The report rejected North Carolina and Georgia’s interpretation of the Articles’ Not-
Members and Legislative-Rights Exceptions, arguing that “[such construction], if right, appears . 
. . to leave the federal powers a mere nullity.”113 “But whatever may be the true construction,” the 
report continued, “it must be impracticable to manage Affairs with the Indians within the limits of 
the two States, so long as they adhere to the opinions and measures they seem to have adopted.”114 
To solve this problem and prevent war, the Committee recommended that the two states must 
either “make liberal cessions of territory to the United States,” or “accede to Congress’ managing, 
exclusively, all affairs with the Cherokees, Creek, and other independent tribes within the limits 
of the said States” so that Congress “may have the acknowledged power of regulating trade, and 
making treaties with those tribes, and of preventing on their lands, the intrusions of the white 
people.”115 The Committee’s suggestions, then, mirrored Knox’s. And if war were to occur, the 
report continued, Georgia should be informed that “Congress . . . can never employ the forces of 
the union in any cause . . . but on the principle that Congress shall have the sole direction of the 
war, and the settling of all the terms of peace with such Indian tribe.”116  
The Committee concluded by proposing several resolutions in accordance with its 
recommendations.117 Eleven states and twenty delegates were present.118 A supermajority of 
fifteen delegates voted to table Few and Blount’s motion and take up the Committee’s 
resolutions.119 Despite this supermajority, Georgia and North Carolina voted no, and two States 
split, leaving the final tally 7-2. So, the resolutions were defeated.120  
Originalist Natelson attributes no significance to this outcome,121 but this vote highlights 
the Articles’ structural inadequacies. Its Nine-State voting requirement prevented a supermajority 
of delegates from taking action that both the Secretary of War and the Southern Department of 
Indian Affairs said was necessary to prevent a ruinous and unwinnable war. Indeed, a generation 
later, Justice Marshall cited this report in Worcester v. Georgia as an example of the Articles’ 
failures.122 
This history makes clear that structural flaws in the Articles undermined Congress’ power 
to regulate Indian affairs. One of these flaws flowed from the Indian Affairs Clause itself, which 
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was, as Madison would later remark, “obscure and contradictory.”123 Despite Congress’ treaty 
power, the Not-Members and Legislative-Right Exceptions of the Indian Affair Clause provided 
States with a pretextual justification to treat independently with the Indian tribes and to violate 
Congress’s Indian treaties.  
But the Indian Affairs Clause was only one part of a broken system. Nothing in the Articles 
explicitly prohibited States from treating with Indians. Nor did the Articles establish congressional 
treaties as supreme over state treaties. And when States seized these ambiguities to assert 
questionable claims, the Articles did not provide for a judiciary to resolve interpretative disputes. 
And, as we have seen, the Articles’ state-centric Nine-Vote requirement afforded Congress little 
recourse to reign in misbehaving States. Thus, because of the Articles’ procedures, Congress found 
itself incapable of enforcing its own treaty and of preventing a disastrous war. The Constitutional 
Convention and ratification debates must be understood against the backdrop of this history.  
 
II. ADOPTING THE CONSTITUTION 
 
As Congress considered the Southern District of Indian Affair’s report in August of 1787, the 
Constitutional Convention had already convened. The drafters sought to fix the structural 
deficiencies that had brought the nation close to war. The federalist argued that the Constitution 
was necessary to end and prevent Indian wars, while anti-federalists warned that the Constitution 
committed an unfettered Indian affairs power to Congress.  
 
A. The Constitutional Convention 
  
As Madison prepared the Virginia Plan prior to the Constitutional Convention, he took 
account of the “Vices of the Political system of the U. States.”124 At the top of his list was 
“Encroachments by the States on the federal authority,” of which a chief example was “the Wars 
and Treaties of Georgia with the Indians.”125 The resultant Virginia Plan provided that the new 
national government would enjoy all the rights “vested in Congress by the Confederation,” and 
also the power “to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which 
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to 
negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National 
Legislature, the articles of the Union.”126  
This provision, which survived the Committee of the Whole, clarified the Articles’ 
jurisdictional ambiguities and stripped North Carolina and Georgia of textual support for their 
interpretation of the Indian Affairs Clause.127   
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Moreover, the Virginia Plan provided several means for the new government to enforce its 
authority. First, the legislature would have power “to call forth the force of the Union agst. Any 
member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles.”128 Second, the Virginia Plan 
called for “a National Judiciary [to] be established.”129 Disputes between the new national 
government and the States would be resolved by an independent branch of government.  
In contrast, the New Jersey Plan called for a continuation of the powers under the Articles 
without any modification.130 Madison replied that the New Jersey Plan would not “prevent 
encroachments” and cited as an example the fact that “[b]y the Federal Articles, transactions with 
the Indian appertain to Congress, yet in several instances the States have entered into treaties and 
wars with them.”131 Madison’s point reflects the precise views of the Southern Indian Affairs’ 
report, of which a supermajority of Congressmen approved but which was nevertheless defeated. 
Although the Committee of Detail’s initial draft of the Constitution gave Congress no 
Indian affairs power, it nevertheless contained several provisions relevant to Indian affairs. For 
starters, the draft gave the Senate “power to make treaties.”132 And whereas the Articles forbade 
states from entering into a treaty “with any King, Prince or State,”133 the draft eliminated this 
qualifier and provided that “No State shall . . . enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation.”134 
Most significantly, the draft made “Acts of the Legislature” and “all treaties made under the 
authority of the United States” the “supreme law of the several States,” which “the judges in the 
several States” would “be bound thereby.”135 No longer could Georgia or any other state point to 
its own treaties as grounds for violating a national treaty. Further, the draft significantly 
strengthened the national government’s military powers. The first listed power of the legislature 
was “the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises”136—empowering Congress 
to fund wars. And in addition to the power to make war, Congress now would have the power “[t]o 
raise armies.”137 Should war break out, Congress would no longer find itself, as Knox had 
lamented, broke and “utterly unable to maintain an Indian war with any dignity or prospect of 
success.”138 Finally, the draft created a judicial power.139 If Georgia or North Carolina again 
asserted a questionable interpretation of the Constitution, an independent judiciary would have the 
authority to invalidate that interpretation.   
 These provisions of the Committee of Detail’s draft remained largely unaltered in 
the final draft of the Constitution. The final Constitution split the power to make treaties between 
 
128 1 FERRAND’S RECORDS 21. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 24. 
131 Id. at 45. 
132 Id. 
133 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1. 
134 2 FARRAND’S RECORD 187 (emphasis added). 
135 Id. at 183. 
136 Id. at 181. 
137 Id. at 182. 
138 33 J. OF CON’T CONG. 388 (July 7, 1787). 
139 2 FARRAND’S RECORD 186. 
198 
 
the President and the Senate140 but carried over the absolute prohibition against states entering into 
treaties141 and the Supremacy Clause.142 The Constitution also gave Congress the power to make 
war,143 raise armies for two year periods144 and fund those armies through “Taxes, Duties, Imposts 
and Excises.”145 Finally, the Constitution created a judiciary, whose power extended to “all Cases 
. . . arising under . . . Treaties made.”146 The Committee of Detail’s report had made structural 
changes that would enable the federal government to manage Indian affairs, and these changes 
were carried into the final draft of the Constitution with few modifications.  
Notably absent from the Committee’s report, however, was any explicit reference to Indian 
affairs. Natelson suggests that this absence meant that the committee thought non-diplomatic 
Indian affairs, such as commercial relations, might better be handled at the state level.147 But this 
suggestion ignores the historical context. Given the specter of war, of course the committee was 
chiefly concerned with assigning the national government control over diplomatic relations with 
the Indians. But that concern does not indicate that the committee thought Indian affairs was 
otherwise best handled at the State level; rather, it indicates only that the committee first focused 
on preventing war.  
Indeed, following the Committee’s report, Madison sought to clarify the federal 
government’s expansive power by motioning to insert the following into the legislature’s powers: 
the power “[t]o regulate affairs with the Indians, as well within as without the limits of the United 
States.”148 Four days later, Rutledge presented the Committee of Detail’s new report, which 
recommended adding to the end of the Commerce power the phrase, “and with Indians, within the 
limits of any State, not subject to the laws thereof.”149 This clause was entirely in line with 
Madison’s proposal and consistent with both Knox’s and the Southern District of Indian Affairs’ 
reports.150  No longer could any state claim that the national government lacked authority over 
Indians merely because those Indians resided within the state. Further, this clause comprehended 
not only diplomatic power, but commercial and regulatory power. Nevertheless, as Robert Clinton 
observes in a different context, “the phrase ‘not subject to the laws thereof’ had the potential for 
reincorporating the entire debate over the legal status of Indians into the text of the Constitution 
since it bore a vague resemblance to the ‘not members of any of the states’ proviso” in the 
Articles.151 The Committee of Eleven ultimately shortened this clause to only “with the Indian 
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tribes,” and the Committee probably did so to head off any debate over the legal status of State 
power over the Indians.152 
The final text of the Constitution, however, read “Congress shall have the power . . . to 
regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes.”153 In fact, recent research has established that the 
final text of the Indian Commerce Clause was a mistake; the Committee of Detail intended to 
include an Indian affairs power.154 The Committee chair, John Rutledge, directed James Wilson to 
include it, and all evidence indicates that Wilson intended to include it, but he appears to have 
simply made a mistake and forgot.155 Instead, Indians were simply added to the pre-existing 
Interstate Commerce Clause. By all accounts, then, the Constitution should have included an 
Indian affairs power. But, this research suggests, by mistake, we have an Indian Commerce power. 
No one appears to have immediately recognized the significance of this gap, a fact which 
is unsurprising. The Constitution strengthened the federal governments war and treaty powers and 
made federal law the supreme law of the land.156 As the ratification debates make clear, both 
federalist and anti-federalist alike assumed that the Constitution gave the federal government 
greater power over Indian affairs.157 The two sides disagreed, however, on whether a strong 
national government was needed to handle Indian hostilities.158 Indeed, Professor Amar has shown 
that the federalists’ primary argument in favor of the Constitution was a geostrategic one,159 and 
the threat of Indian hostilities was one piece of that argument.  In short, the Constitution did 
strengthen federal power over Indian affairs, and the gap between Commerce and Affairs was not 
immediately recognized. 
 
B. The Ratification Debates 
 
Throughout the ratification debates, everyone assumed the Constitution dramatically 
increased federal power over Indian affairs. In Federalist 3, John Jay argued that wars were less 
likely to occur with a strong national government and noted particularly that “[n]ot a single Indian 
war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government,” but that “there are 
several instance of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual 
States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the 
slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.”160 In Massachusetts’s debate, John Carnes read a letter 
from Harrison Gray Otis, noting that the “probability of Indian war . . . evinced the great necessity 
of the establishment of an efficient federal government, which will be the result of the adoption of 
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the proposed Constitution.”161 Likewise, Horatio Gates, writing to Madison about hostilities with 
the Cherokee, said, “Every thing [sic] I hear, every thing [sic] I know, convinces me, that unless 
we have as Speedily as possible a Firm, Efficient, Federal Constitution establishd [sic], all must 
go to Ruin, and Anarchy and Misrule.”162  
Anti-federalist Patrick Henry in Virginia responded to this argument, writing, “It is well 
known that we have nothing to fear from [the Indians]. Our back settlers are considerably stronger 
than they.”163 Rather, Henry warned, Congress’ enhanced treaty power would enable it to seize 
land from the States: “By the Confederation, the rights of territory are secured. No treaty can be 
made without the consent of nine states. While the consent of nine states is necessary to the cession 
of territory, you are safe. If it be put in the power of a less number, you will infallibly lose 
[territory.]”164 
Anti-federalist Roberts Yates understood that the Constitution gave management of Indian 
affairs to Congress. Writing as Sydney, he asked, “What can we reasonably to expect will be [the 
national government’s] conduct when possessed of the powers ‘to regulate commerce . . . with the 
Indian tribes,’ when they are armed with legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and their laws 
the supreme laws of the land?”165 Yates answered, “It is . . . evident that this state, by adopting the 
new government,” would both “enervate their legislative rights,” and “totally surrender into the 
hands of Congress the management and regulation of the Indian trade . . . .”166 Yates’s “legislative 
rights” language appears to refer to the Legislative-Right Exception in the Articles’ Indian Affairs 
Clause. And here, Yates suggests that the Constitution eliminates that Exception, thus expanding 
the National Government’s Indian affairs power. Both the federalists and the anti-federalists 
understood that the Constitution expanded the National Government’s power over Indian 
affairs.167 
This history undermines Justice Thomas and Originalist Natelson’s view that the 
ratification debates provide no evidence that the ratifiers understood the Constitution “to confer 
anything resembling plenary power over Indian affairs.”168 Justice Thomas and Natelson find 
support for their view in the fact that the Indian Commerce Clause was infrequently debated.  But 
their view is historically and structurally tone-deaf. Under the Articles, states had undermined 
national power over Indian affairs by treating and warring with the Indian tribes independently 
from Congress.169 The Constitution strengthened the federal government’s treaty and war powers 
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and thereby strengthened the federal government’s Indian affairs power, and both federalists and 
anti-federalists assumed that the Constitution strengthened the national government’s power over 
Indian affairs. 
 
III. LIFE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
 
 Although some originalists, such as Natelson, argue that post-ratification history is 
irrelevant for constitutional interpretation,170 Professor Amar argues the Washington 
Administration deserves special constitutional consideration because the Constitution’s executive 
powers were crafted open-endedly with full knowledge that George Washington would be 
President.171 Amar’s points are especially forceful where, as here, the Founders designed the 
Constitution to enable the Federal government to immediately fix a problem—in this case, a 
potential Indian war—that it had been unable to resolve under the Articles.  After all, the history 
of life under the Articles, the drafting of the Constitution, and the ratification debates all indicate 
that the Federal government now possessed a general Indian Affairs Power. If this thesis is correct, 
we would expect Washington and the First Congress to act accordingly. In fact, they did.  
In his July 7, 1789 report to Congress, Knox proposed a policy that would later be adopted: 
 
“Although the disposition of the people of the states to emigrate into the Indian 
country cannot be effectually prevented, it may be restrained by postponing new 
purchases of Indian territory, and by prohibiting the citizens from intruding on the 
Indian lands. It may be regulated by forming colonies under the direction of the 
government and by posting a body of troops to execute their orders.”172 
 
Knox’s proposal was perhaps the earliest formulation of an Indian strategy for the United 
States, and within the proposal lay a conundrum: Absent a treaty, under what legal grounds could 
the United States “prohibit[] the citizens from intruding on the Indian lands”? Surely, the United 
States could ban commercial trading on Indian land, but an intrusion on Indian lands falls outside 
of mere commercial trade. Nevertheless, as discussed in Part IV, within a few short years, the 
United States would implement Knox’s proposal, and the Washington Administration and the First 
Congress would wrangle with justifying Knox’s proposal under the powers of the Constitution.  
The first step to implementing Knox’s proposal began on August 22, 1789, the first and 
only time President Washington spoke to the Senate in person.173  Reminding the Senate that North 
Carolina and Georgia had violated the Hopewell Treaties, Washington stated that the treaty 
Commissioners should reassure the southern Indian Tribes that the United State would take 
measure to establish trade relations pursuant to the treaties of Hopewell.174  
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Washington went further and warned the Senate that “the case of the Creek nation is of the 
highest importance and requires an immediate decision.”175 After recounting the history between 
Georgia and the Creek, President Washington sought the advice and consent of the Senate on 
several questions. One of these questions asked what the treaty Commissioners could do if they 
found that the Creek’s complaints were valid.176 If Georgia bore responsibility, could the 
Commissioners pay the Creek fair compensation and guarantee the Creek both their remaining 
territory and a line of military posts?177 These military posts were necessary, as Knox wrote 
Washington, to provide “military force” to deter “the lawless whites as well as Indians.”178 After 
deliberation, the Senate answered in the affirmative.179 Finally, the United States would have the 
power to decisively resolve the Southern Indian conflict.  
Washington appointed Knox to take the lead in these treaties, and this appointment made 
sense. Knox had been Congress’ point person on Indian affairs for many years, and he had written 
to Congress in 1787 warning of the possibility of a “general Indian war.” He was not only familiar 
with Indian policy but also with the Indians themselves. Indeed, Knox’s presence had a 
tranquilizing effect on the Creeks.180 In light of this experience, Washington wisely put Knox in 
charge of his Southern Indian policy.  
 A letter Knox sent to Washington during these treaty negotiations reveals the 
Administration’s view that the Constitution committed Indian affairs to the Federal Government. 
Knox noted that, under the Constitution, even “individual States claiming or possessing the right 
of preemption to territory inhabited by indians . . . . would have to request the General Government 
to direct a treaty for that purpose.”181 “[A]s Indian Wars almost invariably arise in consequence of 
disputes relative to boundaries, or trade, and as the right of declaring War, making treaties, and 
regulating commerce, are vested in the United States,” Knox argued, “It is highly proper they 
should have the sole direction of all measures for the consequences of which they are 
responsible.”182 
 Knox’s presented a stronger view of federal power over Indian affairs than even the most 
ardent nationalist would have asserted under the Articles. While Madison believed that States 
possessed only a right of pre-emption under the Articles, even he admitted that states could 
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negotiate with Indians residing within their own territory.183 Under Knox’s view, states could no 
longer do so; rather, they would have to seek the Federal government’s leadership.  
President Washington’s Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, agreed with Knox. In the 
course of negotiating with the Southern Indians, Knox had written Jefferson and asked for 
Jefferson’s opinion on the legal status of land claimed by North Carolina but secured by the Treaty 
of Hopewell to the Cherokee.184 In his answer, Jefferson argued that “N. Carolina . . . had only a 
right of preemption of these lands.”185 When North Carolina ratified the Constitution, it 
“convey[ed] them only this right of preemption, and the right of occupation could not be united to 
it till obtained by the U.S. from the Cherokees.”186 Jefferson’s view thus mirrored Knox’s: a state 
could not independently treat with the Indians, even for land within its own borders. Rather, it 
would have to wait for the Federal Government. 
 In contrast to the many years of unresolved Southern Indian conflict under the Articles, the 
Washington Administration quickly ameliorated the conflict with the Creeks. Roughly a year after 
appointing Knox, on August 12, 1790, Washington presented, and the Senate ratified, a treaty with 
the Creeks.187 Ironically, this treaty was ratified by almost the same vote that had defeated the 
Southern District of Indian Affair’s 1787 report: 15-4.188 The treaty provided that “in order to 
extinguish forever all claims of the Creek nation” to certain lands, the United States would pay the 
Creek money.189 In light of Washington’s previous question to the Senate, this clause indicates 
that the Commissioners believed that the Creek’s grievances against Georgia were well founded.190 
The treaty also provided, “If any citizen of the United States, or other person not being an Indian, 
shall attempt to settle on any of the Creeks lands, such person shall forfeit the protection of the 
United States, and the Creeks may punish him or not, as they please.”191 In less than a year, Knox 
had managed to solve, and, significantly, to justly solve, the threat of war with the Creek, a problem 
that had hung over the Nation for several years under the Articles. In light of this history, it is clear 
that the Constitution was meant to strengthen federal control over Indian affairs. 
Nevertheless, a power gap still lurked in the Constitution’s text: What if Congress sought to 
pass a non-economic law, and that law was not made pursuant to a treaty between the United States 
and an Indian tribe? No one appears to have considered this problem up to the Constitution’s 
ratification. But they soon would. 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS 
 
 One problem lurked in the background, waiting to be answered: How would Congress 
regulate non-economic interactions with Indian tribes when no treaty was present? Although the 
Constitution was clearly intended to (and did) grant greater power over Indian affairs to the federal 
government, Article I only expressly gives Congress the power “to Regulate Commerce . . . with 
the Indian Tribes.”192 Could Congress prohibit Americans from murdering Indians, in Indian 
territory, when the United States did not have a treaty with that tribe? On July 22, 1790, Congress 
passed, and the President signed into law, “An Act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian 
tribes.”193 As the Act was the first significant legislation directed toward Indian affairs, a careful 
study of the Act reveals how extensive the First Congress viewed its power over Indians. The text 
of the Act makes clear that the First Congress viewed the Commerce Clause as broad enough to 
encapsulate interactions of any kind. 
Sections One through Three of that Act regulated trade relations with the Indians. These 
Sections are easily valid under the Indian Commerce Clause.  
Section Four declared that “no sale of lands made by any Indians . . . shall be valid” to any 
person, “or to any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the 
same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United 
States.”194 This Section accords with Knox and Jefferson’s view that the Constitution forbade 
states from independently treating with Indian tribes and provides powerful evidence that the First 
Congress also recognized that the Constitution increased—not decreased—federal power over 
Indian affairs.  
Section Five provided that if “any citizen” should commit “any crime”—even a non-
economic crime—against “any Indian” in “Indian territory,” that citizen would be guilty of that 
crime, even if no treaty existed195 While Section Five would have been easily justifiable under an 
Indian affairs power, since it is non-economic in nature, under the modern Court’s conception of 
the Commerce Clause, it appears that the Commerce Clause cannot justify its legitimacy. Several 
scholars have debated which constitutional provisions justifies Section Five. Professors Amar and 
Balkin argue that Section Five evinces a broad definition of “Commerce,” roughly equivalent to 
“intercourse,” or even “affairs.”196 Robert Natelson argues that Section Five was passed pursuant 
to the Treaty Clause. Finally, Professor Gregory Ablavsky argues that Section Five is justified by 
a sort-of constitutional field preemption.197 Of these, the text and structure of the statute clearly 
supports the Amar/Balkin approach. Subsequent Congresses endorsed this broad definition of 
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Commerce and adopted subsequent Trade and Intercourse Acts. Over the next forty years, later 
Congresses endorsed this broad definition of Commerce by adopting subsequent Trade and 
Intercourse Acts, forming a tradition which ultimately led Justice Marshall to recognize a broad 
definition of Commerce in two of the major Indian affairs cases in the history of the United 
States—Cherokee Nation v. Georgia198 and Worcester v. Georgia.199 
According to the Amar/Balkin view, “commerce” at the time of the founding had two 
definitions. The first meant roughly trade or economic activity, but the second was broader and 
meant “intercourse,” or “affairs.”200 In fact, Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined Commerce as, 
“Intercourse; exchange of one thing for another; interchange of any thing; trade; traffick [sic].”201 
Under this second, broader definition, Congress could regulate all interactions with the Indians, 
and Congress would therefore have approximately an Indian affairs power. Founding-era history, 
tradition, and precedent argue in favor of the Amar/Balkin approach. 
In light of the pre-Constitutional history, the Constitution was meant to strengthen federal 
power over Indian affairs. Given this history and the enhanced federal Indian powers formed from 
the structure of the Treaty and War powers, it would be strange to read the Constitution as 
conferring only an economic, and therefore lesser, power over Indian affairs than the Articles of 
Confederation.  Moreover, a broad reading of Commerce accords with the structural mandate given 
to the Committee of Detail “to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, 
or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual 
Legislation.”202 
In fact, the Trade and Intercourse Act provide powerful evidence that the First Congress 
considered the Constitution as a whole and adopted a broad definition of “Commerce.” First, and 
most obviously, the title of the Act (“An Act to Regulate the Trade and Intercourse with the Indian 
Tribes”) literally mirrors the two definitions of “commerce.” Moreover, although Will Baude has 
observed that the Statutes at Large do not necessarily reflect the actual text of the law passed,203 
the Annals of Congress make clear that the title of the Act is in the original.204 The Act’s authors 
thus seemed to have declared the power which justifies the Act: the Commerce Clause. 
The contents of the Act also support this view. The first four sections of the Act deal with 
economic regulation, and the fifth section deals with intercourse.  Section Five prohibits even non-
economic crimes, so an economic definition of commerce cannot justify Section Five. And, as 
discussed, Section Five was not passed pursuant to a treaty, so the Treaty power cannot justify it. 
But Section Five regulates American intercourse with Indians, and so the second, broader 
definition of commerce can. 
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The First Congress was not alone in adopting this broad definition of “Commerce;” George 
Washington also viewed the national government’s power over Indians affairs to extend to 
“regulating an intercourse with [the Indians].”205 And in his Fourth Annual Message to Congress, 
Washington explained that he could not “dismiss the subject of Indian affairs without again 
recommending to your consideration the expediency of more adequate provision for . . . restraining 
the commission of outrages upon the Indians; without which all pacific plans must prove 
nugatory.”206 Recognizing the Committee of Detail’s mistake in failing to give Congress an Indian 
affairs power, the First Congress and George Washington recognized that “commerce” and 
“affairs” were synonyms and adopted the broader definition of commerce. 
This broad definition of Commerce was adopted by later Congresses, who passed six 
consecutive Trade and Intercourse Acts—each continuing Section Five’s non-economic criminal 
prohibitions.207 Likewise, in House debates in the decade after the founding, the phrase “commerce 
with the Indians” was often used synonymously with “intercourse with the Indians.”208  
By the time the Supreme Court first discussed the Trade and Intercourse Acts some forty 
years later, this broad definition of commerce had become a tradition—and a tradition which 
Justice Marshall recognized in doctrine in both Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia209 and 
Worcester v. State of Georgia.210   In Cherokee Nation, Justice Marshall discussed the Trade and 
Intercourse Acts and then affirmed the plaintiff’s contention for a federal Indian affairs power by 
citing the Commerce Clause: 
 
 [T]he word ‘Indian tribes’ were introduced into the article, empowering congress 
to regulate commerce, for the purpose of removing the doubts in which the 
management of Indian affairs was involved in the language of the ninth article of 
the confederation. Intending to give the whole power of managing those affairs to 
the government about to be instituted, the convention conferred it explicitly.211 
 
Removing all doubt on the textual basis for this Indian affairs power, Justice Marshall then wrote 
that the Commerce Clause conferred on Congress the “power of regulating intercourse.”212 Justice 
Marshall returned to this argument in Worcester,213 where ten times he wrote of Congress’s power 
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to “regulate . . . intercourse.”214 These repeated assertions mirror the Article I clause giving 
Congress the power “to regulate Commerce.”215 Thus, in two of the most important historical 
Indian law cases, Justice Marshall explicitly recognized that the Commerce Clause conferred on 
Congress the power to regulate intercourse—not merely trade or economic activity.   
Natelson takes a different approach and argues that Section Five merely implemented the 
Treaties of Hopewell.216 However, while the Treaties of Hopewell have similar commercial and 
criminal provisions as the Trade and Intercourse Acts, the two documents are irreconcilably 
different.  Article Nine of the Treaties specified that “the United States . . . shall have the sole and 
exclusive right of regulating trade with the Indians.”217 Article Nine of the Treaties corresponds to 
Sections One through Three of the Act. And Article Seven of the Treaties said, “If any citizen of 
the United States . . . shall commit a robbery or murder or other capital crime, on any Indian, such 
offender shall be punished . . . .”218 Like Article Seven, Section Five of the Act prohibits crimes 
against “any Indian.”  
However, unlike Article Nine of the treaties, Section Five does not limit itself to capital 
crimes. And Section Five prohibits crimes against all Indians, not merely the signatory Indian 
tribes.219  Admitting that Section Five applies to more than merely the signatory tribes, Natelson 
argues that the “all Indian” language of the Treaties’ Section Nine signified a commitment by 
Congress to pass a criminal provision that applies to all tribes.220 
Natelson’s interpretation is untenable. Article Nine’s “all Indians” language clearly 
referred to all Indians belonging to the signatory tribe, not all Indians whatsoever. In each of the 
Hopewell Treaties, the first three Articles established that the treaty was between the United States 
and the respective Indian tribe. Only after these Articles did the unqualified phrase “any Indian” 
occur, and the context of these latter Articles makes clear the limited nature of the Treaties.221 For 
example, Article Six of the Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokee specifies, “If any Indian . . . 
shall commit a robbery, or murder, or other capital crime on any citizen of the United States . . . 
.”222 Surely, the Cherokee were not purporting to bind every Indian, whether or not part of the 
Cherokee, from committing a capital crime against the United States. The inverse is also true: If a 
New Yorker murdered an Iroquois Indian, surely the Cherokee could not claim that the United 
States violated the Treaty of Hopewell. And Natelson’s interpretation suffers from an even more 
obvious flaw: The Trade and Intercourse Act prohibits a much broader class of crimes than the 
Treaties of Hopewell. While similarities exist between the Treaties and the Act, it is wrong to say 
that the Act implemented the Treaties. 
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Although Natelson does not suggest it, could a combination of the Treaty and Necessary 
and Proper Clauses justify Section Five? After all, the history of the Trade and Intercourse Acts 
indicates that they were passed to assist the Washington Administration in negotiating future 
Indian treaties.223 Past efforts to build treaties had been frustrated by white settlers killing 
Indians.224 So long as these atrocities continued, the United States would be unable to negotiate 
treaties. Among other things, the Trade and Intercourse Act was meant to assist Washington in 
treaty negotiations by putting a stop to these atrocities. Indeed, mere minutes before passing the 
first Trade and Intercourse Act, the President signed into law “An Act providing for holding a 
Treaty or Treaties to establish Peace with certain Indian tribes.”225 The first Trade and Intercourse 
Act specified that it would be valid for a period of two years,226and as this two year period expired, 
Washington addressed Congress in the Fourth Annual Message to Congress.227 Washington 
explained that he could not “dismiss the subject of Indian affairs without again recommending to 
your consideration the expediency of more adequate provision for . . . restraining the commission 
of outrages upon the Indians; without which all pacific plans must prove nugatory.”228 Congress 
responded quickly and, on March 1, 1793, enacted the second Trade and Intercourse Act.229 
Notably, the Act’s criminal provisions prohibited “any citizen” from committing “any crime,” 
while in Indian territory, against “any friendly Indian.”230 The Act thus ensured that Americans 
would not commit crimes against friendly Indians—whether or not those Indians had a treaty with 
the United States.  Over the next several decades, Congress updated the Trade and Intercourse 
Acts, but the Acts’ criminal prohibitions never disappeared. Based off this history, perhaps a 
combination of the Treaty and the Necessary and Proper Clauses could justify Section Five. So 
long as crimes were committed against otherwise friendly Indian tribes, the United States would 
be unable to enter treaties with those tribes. Thus, restraining those crimes was necessary and 
proper to exercise the treaty power.  
However, this necessary and proper argument suffers from two shortcomings, one 
theoretical and one textual. For starters, only an extraordinarily expansive conception of the 
necessary and proper clause could justify Section Five. Section Five never even mentions the word 
“treaty,” even in reference to future treaties.231 Section Five thus applied even when the United 
States had no active treaty plans. Under this view of the necessary and proper clause, the United 
States has power to regulate any conduct that might someday interfere with a treaty negotiation, 
even if that conduct never actually posed a threat to a treaty negotiation—quite an expansive view 
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of the Necessary and Proper Clause indeed. Second, and more fundamentally, this necessary and 
proper theory flies in the face of the plain text of the statute, whose title expressly disclaims which 
power justifies the Act—the Commerce Clause.  
Finally, Professor Ablavsky argues that a holistic reading of the Constitution shows that, 
because of a combination of the Treaty, War, Commerce, and Supremacy Clauses, the realm of 
Indian affairs was reserved to the federal government in a manner akin to modern day field pre-
emption.232 In support of this view, Ablavsky cites correspondence between members of the 
Washington Administration, such as Knox and Jefferson, who argued that the Constitution’s War, 
Treaty, Commerce, and Supremacy Clauses conferred all power over treaty negotiations on the 
national government.233 
But Ablvasky’s view suffers from theoretic flaws. Most importantly, Ablavsky’s view 
divides the Indian affairs’ power into several component parts, and this division creates gaps that 
render the Trade and Intercourse Act unconstitutional. That Act prohibits non-economic criminal 
behavior in a foreign nation with whom the United States did not yet have a treaty. Thus, under an 
economic definition of Commerce, no clause of the Constitution can justify the Act. 
History also contradicts Ablavsky’s view. In support of his argument, Ablavsky cites 
members of the Washington administration, such as Knox and Jefferson, who suggested that the 
Constitution’s War, Treaty, and Commerce powers gave the federal government exclusive power 
over Indian affairs.234 These correspondences, however, took place while the Washington 
administration was in the midst of, or had just resolved, treaty negotiations.235  The Washington 
Administration was obviously correct that the federal government had the sole prerogative to 
negotiate treaties with the Indian tribes. But Section Five’s non-economic criminal prohibition 
applied without a treaty—or even a planned treaty negotiation.  
Perhaps tacitly recognizing this distinction, Ablavsky claims that “Congress did not state 
which power it exercised in enacting the [Trade and Intercourse Act].”236 But this is clearly false. 
The very caption of the Act expressly disclaims the power which justifies it—the Commerce 
Clause. 
The First Congress, like the Southern District of Indian Affairs before it, viewed the power 
to regulate Indian affairs as “indivisible,”237 and “commerce” can mean “intercourse” which can 
mean “affairs.” The simplest way to “solve” the Indian affairs gap is to do as the First Congress 
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V. CONCLUSION AND APPLICATION TO OTHER AREAS 
 
 Far from suggesting—as Justice Thomas and several scholars have argued—that the 
Constitution reduced Federal power over Indian affairs,238 the structure of the Constitution—as 
well as the history, tradition, and judicial doctrine of the early Republic—demonstrate that the 
Constitution strengthened and solidified federal power over Indian affairs. Towards that end, 
“Commerce” was interpreted broadly to mean “intercourse.”  This conclusion has implications for 
federal Indian law as well as the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clauses. The Court currently 
holds that the federal government exercises plenary authority over the Indian tribes.239 While a 
broad definition of Commerce seems to confer an Indian affairs power on the federal government, 
it is unclear whether this power could justify plenary power over the purely internal affairs of 
Indian tribes, and future research should further flesh out the doctrinal implications of an Indian 
Intercourse power. In relation to the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clauses, what Prakash calls 
“the presumption of intrasentence uniformity”240 suggests that “commerce” should mean the same 
thing in all three Commerce Clauses. Nevertheless, Adrian Vermeule has pointed out that each of 
the three Commerce Clauses has a unique relationship to history and the other structures of the 
Constitution, and that each clause might therefore mean something different.241 The same 
historical and structural features that argue in favor of a broad definition of the Indian Commerce 
Clause also argue in favor of a broad definition of the Foreign Commerce Clause, and Balkin has 
shown that a broad definition of Commerce provides firmer textual footing to the Court’s foreign 
affairs and immigration doctrines. But these historical and structural features appear at first glance 
to be absent from the Interstate Commerce Clause. Still, Balkin has demonstrated that a broad 
definition of Commerce maps well onto Interstate Commerce doctrine,242 and Amar has shown 
how such a definition would justify federal power to regulate in a global pandemic, such as the 
Coronavirus.243 Future research should examine the applicability of a broad definition of Congress 
to the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clauses. 
The Supreme Court has long endorsed the view that the federal government enjoys plenary 
power over the Indian tribes.244 Plenary power, in the Court’s view, means both exclusive federal 
power over Indian affairs245 and absolute authority over Indian tribes, including their internal 
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affairs.246 In support of this power, the Court routinely cites the Indian Commerce Clause.247 But 
this citation is unsatisfying in light of the Court’s insistence that “commerce” refers to economic 
activity.248 
 While “intercourse” may mean “affairs,” it is not clear that the power to regulate 
intercourse or affairs implies plenary powers over a tribe’s internal matters. “Intercourse” implies 
interaction between the Indian tribes and the United States, but the plenary power doctrine includes 
the totally internal affairs of the Indians, at least on state land. For example, in Kagama—the case 
that established the modern plenary power doctrine—the Court held that Congress had the power 
to prohibit the murder of one Indian by another Indian on an Indian reservation.249 The power to 
regulate intercourse, therefore, may be less spacious than a plenary power over Indians. And future 
research should investigate the extent of an intercourse power over Indian affairs.  
The perhaps more interesting implication of this research lies in its application to the 
Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clauses. Given the “presumption of intrasentence 
uniformity,”250 if “commerce” means “intercourse” in the Indian Commerce Clause, then it should 
also mean intercourse in the other two Commerce Clauses. Moreover, the same structural features 
underlying a broad reading of the Indian Commerce Clause apply to the Foreign Commerce 
Clause. In the context of Indian affairs, the Constitution sought to solidify America’s geostrategic 
position by strengthening the federal government’s power. And this geostrategic strengthening is 
visible in the structure formed by the War, Treaty, and Commerce powers, amongst others. This 
same geostrategic reasoning applies to foreign affairs. Just as “commerce” should be interpreted 
broadly to better effectuate the Constitution’s structural geopolitical purpose in Indian affairs, so 
too should it be read broadly to effectuate that structural purpose in foreign affairs. Moreover, 
Professor Balkin has demonstrated that a broad definition of the Foreign Commerce Clause 
provides an analytically satisfying explanation for the power to regulate Immigration and Foreign 
Affairs.251 Future research could further investigate the validity of a broad definition of Commerce 
to the Foreign Commerce Clause and apply this research to the Court’s Foreign Affairs doctrine.   
Perhaps the most interesting question is whether this broad definition of Commerce applies 
equally to the Interstate Commerce Clause. As Professor Balkin has shown, a broad reading of 
Commerce in the Interstate Commerce Clause maps well onto current Commerce Clause 
doctrine.252 Further, since an Interstate Intercourse Power would cover any problem that flows 
over state lines, that power would justify federal authority to legislate in cases of a pandemic—
such as the Coronavirus.253  
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There are several reasons to adopt this broad definition of Commerce for the Interstate 
Commerce Clause. First, Prakash is correct that it is natural to read one word as meaning the same 
thing throughout a single sentence.254 Second, as Professor Balkin has argued, a broad reading of 
Commerce in the Interstate Commerce Clause accords with the structural mandate given to the 
Committee of Detail “to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent . . . .”255 
Finally, a broad definition of Commerce provides a more analytically satisfying explanation of 
current Commerce Clause doctrine.256  
On the other hand, many of the historical and structural features supporting a broad reading 
of the Indian Commerce Clause appear lacking in the Interstate Commerce Clause. It is not 
immediately clear that regulating interstate intercourse was a problem under the Articles of 
Confederation that the founders sought to remedy. The Interstate Commerce Clause also lacks the 
structural support that the Foreign and Indian Commerce Clauses find in the War and Treaty 
Clauses. Unlike Foreign Nations and Indian Tribes, other states are recognized in the Constitution 
as distinct American sovereignties; federalism may argue for a narrower reading of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.  Further, originalist research has established that both the general public and 
internal government documents normally used interstate “commerce” in its narrow economic 
sense.257 And the great majority of Interstate Commerce Clause cases in the first century after the 
founding concerned either state or federal economic regulations258—although this doctrine may be 
merely a function of the Courts institutional limitation in deciding cases or controversies. Finally, 
the Constitution may be precisely the type of text where the presumption of intrasentence 
uniformity does not apply. As Adrian Vermeule has noted, the Commerce Clause is in fact three 
clauses, each with its own unique history and relationship to the other provisions of the 
Constitution.259 This Note supports Vermeule’s points, and it is entirely possible that Commerce 
may have a different definition in each. Future research can expand on these arguments and map 
a broad definition of Commerce onto current doctrine. 
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vendors of lottery tickets); Southern S. S. Co. of New Orleans v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. 31 (1867) (Louisiana law 
charging fees for every vessel arriving in port); Ward v. State, 79 U.S. 418 (1870) (Maryland law regulating in-state 
and out-of-state traders); Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875) (Missouri law requiring licenses for out-of-
state traders); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877) (congressional act prohibiting states 
from excluding or discriminating against out-of-state telegraphic companies). 
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